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There  has long been a consensus that generous unem ployment  benefits
probably  raise unem ployment  rates.  The link has been difficult to
demonstrate,  however, since existing indicators on the generosity o f
unemployment  benefits overlook key as pects  of the system   that m ay
influence  worker response.  The au thor  develops a new indicator fo r
unemployment benefits in 21 countries in the 1950-2003 time period which
combines the amount of the subsidy with their tax treatment, their duration
and the conditions that m ust be met in order to collect them .  The new
indicator  shows that benefit genero sity  has indeed risen over tim e  and













































































Every  industrialized country has a schem e  that  provides the jobless with tem porary 
compensation  for lost earnings, as long as they   meet  certain conditions.  Most of these 
programs were put in place after World War II, with the purpose of providing income security 
for workers and their families.  Since unemployment falls hardest on lower-income categories 
of workers, the programs are also intended to promote greater equality. 
i  And they also have 
an efficiency objective: to enable workers to  take the time to find a better “m atch” between 
their abilities and the needs of the job market, thus enhancing efficiency overall. 
Unemployment benefits may, however, work agai nst these objectives and actually increase 
unemployment rates.  If the benefits are high in  relation to the expected m arket wage, they 
give workers incentives to remain jobless for longer periods, and boost the “reservation wage” 
at which they would be willing to reenter the job market.  Many empirical studies find that the 
duration  of unem ployment  spells is linked to  the  level of benefits: in recent studies, the 
outflow rates from unemployment were found to increase considerably at around the time that 
unemployment benefits were exhausted in th e United States, Canada, Japan, France, Spain
ii, 
Sweden
iii,  the Netherlands
iv  and Germ any
v.  Other studies have shown that the way that 
benefits  are adm inistered  –what the requirem ents  are for job search or for reporting to 
officials— have a substantial effect on unem ployment duration.
vi This effect is more intense 
when  benefits are com bined  with other provisi ons  for the jobless, such as child care or 
housing allowances, which are provided in many countries.
vii  
Since unemployment benefits provide an alternative to work, they generate wage pressures 
that spread throughout the economy.  Unions may make stronger wage demands if they know 
that dismissed workers will be well provided  for; and the higher “reservation wage” that 
results from the availability of non-work income also puts upward pressure on wages.
viii This 
is particularly true in countries where  low-income groups face high average tax rates.
ix  If 
unemployment insurance has a high budget cost , the government may find it necessary to 
raise payroll or other taxes to finance the benefits.  This will further boost labor costs and the 
impact  on unem ployment  will be intensif ied.
x  Generally, it is accepted that generous 
unemployment benefit systems raise unemployment rates.
 xi   
 
Do unemployment benefits achieve their goal of  promoting equity and efficiency?   Some 
economists  argue that they are not effectivel y  targeted at the poor and are “inherently 
inefficient and inequitable” as currently practiced in most countries.
xii  There is also evidence 
that they may affect employment rates.  The availability of benefits may raise joblessness, but 
it  may  also attract people into the work f orce  so that they can eventually qualify for 
benefits.
xiii    
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Discussion:  How Can the Generosity of Unemployment Benefits Be Measured? 
Most  empirical  studies that have attem pted  to  evaluate the im pact  of benefit levels on 
employment, unemployment and equity have us ed the OECD’s comprehensive indicator for 
gross replacement rates to represent the unem ployment benefit system.  This complex index, 
first published in the 1994 Jobs Study, covers odd years in the 1961-1999 period and attempts 
to summarize the level of gross unemployment benefit entitlements relative to gross earnings 
in each OECD country.  To do this, it takes  an unweighted average of 18 gross replacem ent 
rates which include three household types (single, dependent spouse and spouse in work) and 
three time periods (the first year, the second and  third year, and the fourth and fifth years of 
unemployment), during which benefits typically va ry. It divides this figure by the average of 
two earnings levels:  average earnings for a  production worker and two-thirds of average 
earnings.
xiv   The result is the m ost  comprehensive  indicator available for the m onetary 
generosity of unemployment benefits across countries and over time. 
Despite  its com plexity,  however, the OECD i ndicator  overlooks several key features of 
unemployment benefits that could conceivably have a large im pact on the net reservation 
wage.  One of these is taxes .  Different tax treatm ent of wages and unemployment benefits 
might alter the replacement rate and have an im pact on workers’ decisions whether or not to 
work.   OECD countries differ widely in th eir  taxation of unem ployment  benefits:  in 
Australia, Austria, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and Portugal, for instance, unem ployment 
insurance benefits are not subject to incom e tax, while in other countries they are taxed, at 
different rates.
xv Tax treatment has also varied in given countries over the postwar period.  So 
far the OECD has developed no “net replacem ent rate” that covers as long a tim e span as its 
gross  replacement  rate: the available data, based on its tax-benefit m odels,  are only for 
selected years.
xvi  
Another important feature of unemployment benefit systems that may condition workers’ job-
market decisions is the duration  of benefits.  OECD countries  vary widely in the am ount of 
time that unemployment benefits are paid out to the jobless (and before they qualify for social 
assistance  schemes,  which are m eans-tested  in  many  countries).  In 1999 they could be 
collected for periods as short as six months in some countries (e.g., Italy, the United Kingdom 
and  the United States) and as long as 60 m onths  in others (Denm ark,  France, the 
Netherlands).
xvii  These different tim e periods, combined with identical replacem ent rates, 
could conceivably have dramatically different effects on the behavior of the unem ployed.  In 
fact, some studies have found th at outflow rates from unemployment increased considerably 
at  around the tim e  that unem ployment  benefits were exhausted in several countries; and 
whether or not an individual would continue to receive benefits was found to be the key factor 
in exit rates from unemployment in the Spanish and Portuguese cases.
xviii  
Possibly the most important factor influencing the decisions of the unemployed, and the most 
difficult to quantify, is how onerous it is to  qualify for and collect unem ployment benefits.  
Again,  countries vary enorm ously  in both the eligibility conditions   they im pose  for  the 
unemployed  to qualify for benefits, and the  strictness  with which these conditions are 
enforced.  In countries like Switzerland and the  United States, for example, the jobless must 
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unemployed  need only display an identity  document  at a governm ent  employment  office 
every  three m onths  to continue receiving bene fits.   These conditions have also changed 
considerably over time in the countries in th is study.  For instance, the unem ployed in the 
immediate postwar period typically lost their be nefits if they refused a suitable job of fer, 
while  by the 1980s they could refuse a job  offer  and continue collecting unem ployment 
insurance after a brief “sanction” period during which benefits were suspended (typically one 
to  several weeks).  These changing conditi ons  may  have had a large influence on the 
decisions of the jobless on whether or not to look for work. 
Many economists believe that the eligibility cond itions for collecting benefits –the definition 
of loss of work and availability for work, valid  reasons for quitting, the definition of suitable 
work,  and requirem ents  to actively seek work
xix  are a key policy tool for m anaging  the 
unemployment problem.  The reasoning behind this  argument is simple.  Whereas with the 
replacement rate (gross or net) or the duration issue, the jobless are pondering a decision over 
collecting  more  or less m oney,  strict eligibility criteria can ef fectively  reduce a given 
replacement rate to zero.  In fact, som e economists believe that well designed and enforced 
eligibility criteria can not only of fset the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits, but 
they can reduce the unem ployment rate to less than the natural rate.  This is their line of  
reasoning: 
The behavior that is supposed to be induced by eligibility criteria –such as being ready 
to start work at short notice— should dir ectly increase the chance of finding work.   
The criteria also imply a disutility effect, which encourages a more intense search for 
work, and an “entry” effect:  if the requirements are onerous (and hence the disutility 
effect  is suf ficiently  large), som e  people  will  drop their benef it  claim  rather than 
comply.  Benefits can actually be m ade conditional upon an intensity of job search 
higher than the individual would undertake  in the absence of a benefit entitlem ent; 
hence benefit systems can be designed to  generate unemployment levels below those 
arising under laissez faire (in the absence of a benefit system).
xx 
 
One study of four European countries that achieved success in labor markets found that much 
stricter enforcement of job search and suitable  work provisions had been a key element in all 
of their reform programs.
 xxi    
 
It  appears, then, that any study attem pting  to  evaluate the im pact  of the unem ployment 
insurance system on labor markets must include its eligibility features.  This aspect, however, 
is so difficult to quantify that it has been om itted from nearly all studies.  Like the EPL 
indicator,  it would require a thorough country- by-country,  year-by-year review of labor 
legislation,  and even such an exhaustive revi ew  would leave out the enforcem ent  factor 
discussed in relation with EPL above.   
  
Some attempts have been made to quantify on a piecemeal basis the strictness of eligibility 
criteria.  One exam ple is a study by the Danish  Ministry of Finance, which constructed in 
1997  an index for the strictness of eligibility   criteria based on independent job search 
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standard duration of benefit sanctions following vol untary quits and refusals of job offers.  It 
evaluated the situation in 19 OECD countries in eight areas:   
 
1.  demands on job search activity,  
2.  demands  on job availability when participating in active labor-m arket 
programs,  
3.  demands on occupational mobility,  
4.  demands on geographical mobility,  
5.  extent of valid reasons for refusal of j ob offers or participation in active labor-
market programs,  
6.  sanctions applied for self-induced resignation from a job,  
7.  sanctions applied for refusal of a job offer or active labor-m arket programs, 
and  
8.  sanctions applied for repeated refusal of the above.   
 
A survey was sent to participating countries, which reported what the legal situation was in 
each of these areas, and also gave an idea of how strictly existing rules were actually enforced 
in their countries.  The answers were scored,  as with the OECD´s EPL indicator above, and a 




The  Danish survey gave researchers a fairly   comprehensive  cross-country indicator for a 
single year.  The indicator has the sam e weaknesses as the EPL indicator discussed above.   
Legislation can often be obscure and difficult to  interpret; variations in enf orcement may be 
very large; and the f inal score is sensitive to th e weighting system that is applied.  W ith its 
weaknesses, however, it does give a good picture of  differences across countries in eligibility 
criteria. 
 
Since this study aimed to evaluate the impact on employment and unemployment rates of all 
of  the m ajor  labor-market  policies and ins titutions,  it required a good indicator for the 
unemployment benefit system.  To portray as co mpletely as possible the disincentive ef fects 
of the unemployment insurance system, it had to  incorporate all of the features discussed 
above:  income  levels of recipients, duration of   benefits, taxes and the eligibility criteria.   
Since  no such indicator existed, developing a  time  series that would approxim ate  a “net 
reservation wage” became another key pursuit of the study. 
 
The logical starting point was the OECD’s gross replacem ent rate time series, which was 
converted roughly into a net replacem ent rate by using a ratio of net to gross replacem ent 
rates given by the OECD in an appendix to its 1997  Jobs Study.
 xxiii  This ratio estimates the 
effect on the replacement rate of personal income taxes and social security payments applied 
to unemployment benefits in four different time periods.
 xxiv 
 
Incorporating  the duration of unem ployment  benefits into the sam e  indicator was m ore 
difficult.  Although data could be obtained on the frequent changes in the m aximum duration 
of benefits from journals and national legislation, simply multiplying the net replacement rate 
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figures that appeared to be too large to reflect  the real income options faced by the jobless.   
Since in fact an unemployed person is more likely to be making a job-search decision on the 
basis of the incom e he/she expects to receive  from the benefit system  over the next few 
months, it was decided to reflect different duration periods only up to one year.  Thus the net 
replacement rate was m ultiplied by some number between 0 and 1:  0 if no benefits were 
available (which was the case in som e OECD countries in the im mediate postwar period), 
some intermediate number if they were availa ble for a fraction of a  year (e.g., 6 m onths = 
0.5), and 1 if they were available for a full y ear or longer.  By the end of the period under 
study, this meant that most countries, even thos e where benefits were practically indefinite, 
were assigned a 1.
 xxv 
 
Finally, a way had to be found to incorporate  the strictness of eligibility criteria into the 
indicator.
  xxvi  Since these criteria can be seen as determ ining the probability of  collecting 
benefits, the scheme developed by the Danish  Finance Ministry was adapted and converted 
into an average probability of  collecting unemployment benefits, based on the strictness of  
eligibility criteria.   
 
The Danish questionnaire was taken as a starti ng point, with some questions omitted because 
information was very difficult to obtain from a review of legislation and the literature.  The 
scores used by the Danish researchers were  converted into probabilities and the weightings 
were  changed som ewhat,  leaving the questionna ire  and its scores as follows (the full 
questionnaire is given in Appendix 1): 
 
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
 
Items 1 through 5 were assigned a weight of one, item 6 a weight of 0.75, and item 7 a weight 
of 0.25 in the final indicator.  The resulting num ber was divided by six (the sum  of all the 
weights) to give a (weighted) average probability of qualifying for unemployment benefits.   
 
This  probability was then m ultiplied  by the other f eatures  of  the unem ployment  benefit 
system described above, to yield a single num ber that would reflect the global generosity of 
the unemployment benefit system and its incentive  or disincentive effects on the jobless.  In 
other words, the final indicator consists of all four features discussed above, as follows: 
 
Net reservation wage (NRW ) = gross replacement rate * (ratio net RR/gross RR) * 
duration * probability of collecting benefit 
 
where duration and probability are both some number between 0 and 1. 
 
The  result, again, is far from   being a perf ect  indicator.  Legislative inform ation  on 
unemployment benefit systems was difficult to obtain, and there were gaps after an exhaustive 
review of labor law for 21 countries and 50 years, using the same sources given above.  These 
gaps could only partially be f illed in from discussions in the specialized literature, and m uch 
guesswork was necessary to construct an indi cator spanning the entire postwar period.  In IE Working Paper                                    EC8-108-I                                         11 - 04 - 2005 
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countries like the United States, Canada or Au stralia, where no Federal law exists setting out 
guidelines for the unemployment insurance system and definition and administration is left up 
to  the individual states
xxvii,  information  could only be taken f rom  the literature.
xxviii 
Enforcement, of course, was also omitted, as were many other aspects of benefit systems.   
 
One highly relevant feature that had to be om itted due to the complexity of the schemes and 
the difficulty of obtaining hom ogeneous information was the housing and other benefits that 
are  available to the unem ployed  in many  OECD countries.  In the United Kingdom , the 
generous  housing benefits given to the unem ployed  may  play a key role in job m arket 
decisions.  In fact, the United Kingdom’s replacement rate as reported in the OECD indicator 
is one of the OECD’s lowest, but experts say that housing and other benefits may make it one 
of the highest.
 xxix One study conducted by the Dutch Cent raal Planbureau in 1995 compared 
the OECD´s estimates of replacement rates with a much broader definition of income support 
to the unemployed that included child support,  supplementary social assistance and housing 
benefits, and additionally estim ated the impact of relevant tax on benefits.  For the United 
Kingdom,  this study estim ated  a replacem ent  rate of either 69.8% or 41.4%
xxx  in 1993, 
compared to an OECD figure of 18.5% in the same year.  Differences for other countries were 
less dramatic, but all of the replacem ent rates calculated by the CPB were higher than those 
obtained by the OECD.
 xxxi                                                                   
 
Another important omission resulted from the decision to use in the indicator only the income 
available under unemployment insurance schemes.  Nearly all countries have supplem entary 
income assistance which can be collected on ce unemployment benefits run out and which 
may extend by months or even years the time that an individual can remain unemployed while 
collecting benefits.  (These supplem entary sources of income were included in the estim ates 
by the Dutch Centraal Planbureau, cited above.) 
xxxii  There are countries like Italy where 
supplementary  schemes  are the m ain  form  of unem ployment  insurance, and where the 
OECD´s replacement rates seriously understate the income that the unemployed can expect to 
receive.  Although Italy´s replacem ent rates are the OECD’s lowest, most jobless during the 
postwar period have received benefits from  alternate support system s like the the Cassa de 
Integrazione  Guadagni Straordinaria (CIG S),  which started as a system   providing 
compensation for short-time working in a lim ited range of industries and was extended in 
1947  to cover tem porary  lay-offs.  It has  gradually  become  a shadow unem ployment 
compensation scheme which offers benefits that  are often indefinite and m uch higher than 
those available under the official unemployment scheme.
 xxxiii  
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Conclusion:  New Indicator Shows How Benefit Generosity Has Risen 
 
Despite its omissions and weaknesses, the rela tively complex indicator developed for this 
study offers some surprising contrasts with the  gross replacement rate as a reflection of the 
generosity  of countries’ unem ployment  insurance  systems.   Unem ployment  benefits 
understood in their fullest sense, as the compendium of incentives offered to the jobless, grew 
steadily more generous from the 1960s onward in m ost countries, with particularly large 
increases coinciding with periods of high unem ployment.  They were trim med in various 
countries in the 1990s in an effort to reduce th e incentives to remain jobless.  This trimming 
often took the form of stricter conditions to collect the benefit.  This effect had escaped earlier 
studies but is f aithfully reproduced here, by a  falling average probability of  being able to 
collect benefits.   
 
The indicator also shows a relatively sharp cont rast between benefit generosity in European 
and  non-European countries, and between  non-English-speaking  and English-speaking 
countries.  In general, unem ployment benefits are higher and easier to collect in the form er 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1:  Unemployment benefit eligibility questionnaire 
Question  Score assigned to answer 
1. Demands on job search 
activity 
.75=no systematic check; .5=unempl oyed must regularly prove job 
search activity; .25=the unemployed must often, i.e., every week or 
every second week, prove job search activity 
2.  Demands  on 
occupational mobility 
.9=the unemployed can refuse job offers in other occupational areas 
for 6 months or more; .7=can refuse for less than 6 m onths; .5=no 
explicit  reservations, but the unem ployed´s  qualifications and the 
length of the unem ployment spell are taken into account; .25=no 
reservation,  meaning  the unem ployed  must  accept all jobs he is 
capable of doing 
3.  Demands  on 
geographical mobility 
.9=no demands; .7=must accept daily transportation time of less than 
2 hours per day; .5=must accept transport time of 2-3 hours; .3=must 
accept transport of 3-4 hours or more; .1=must be willing to move 
4. Extent of valid reasons 
for refusal of job offers or 
ALMPs 
.75=relatively large number of valid reasons for refusal; .5=average 
amount of restrictions; .25=relatively few valid reasons for refusal 
5.  Sanctions applied for 
refusal  of job offer or 
ALMP 
.9=0-4  weeks; .7=5-9 weeks; .5=10-14  weeks; .3=m ore  than 14 
weeks; .1=suspension of unemployment benefit 
6.  Sanctions applied for 
repeated  refusal of job 
offer or ALMP 
.9=no further sanctions in case of repeated rejections; .7=sanctions 
are  more  rigorous after third rejection; .5=sanctions are m ore 
rigorous  after second rejection and unem ployed  could lose 
entitlement  to benef its;  .3=suspension of   unemployment  benefits 
after second rejection; .1=benefit has already been suspended after 
first rejection 
7.  Sanctions applied for 
self-induced  resignation 
from job 
.9=0-4  weeks; .7=5-9 weeks; .5=10-14  weeks; .3=m ore  than 14 
weeks; .1=suspension of unemployment benefit IE Working Paper                                     WP05-18                                         11 - 04 - 2005 
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Chart 1: Different measures of unemployment benefit generosity in selected countries 
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Appendix 1:  The Questionnaire for Benefit Eligibility 
 
The questionnaire below lists (in bold face) the specific questions that were asked regarding  
each law approved during the period in the countries surveyed, to evaluate the relevant aspects  
of eligibility for unemployment benefits.  The scores assigned for each possible answer (which are  
an attempt to reflect the probability of being eligible to collect benefits) are given in plain type  
below the question. IE Working Paper                                    EC8-108-I                                  11 - 04 - 2005 
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N a m e   o f   L a w         N u m b e r     D a t e  
ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT 
  Is the unemployed person required to demonstrate that 
he/she is actively seeking work in order to collect 
unemployment benefits? 
0.75=no systematic check 
0.5=the unemployed must regularly prove job search activity 
.25=the unemployed must often, i.e., every week or every second week, 
prove job search activity 
Is the unemployed person required to accept a job that is  
offered which is outside the occupational area that he/she 
is trained for or has worked in? 
0.9=the unemployed can refuse job offers in other occupational areas 
for 6 months or more  
0.7=the unemployed can refuse job offers in other occupational areas 
for less than 6 months  
0.5=there are no explicit reservations, but the unemployed´s qualifications 
and length of the unemployment spell are taken into account 
0.25=no reservation, meaning the unemployed must accept any job offered 
that he is capable of doing 
Is the unemployed person required to move to a different 
geographical area if a job is offered to him/her there? 
0.9=no demands 
0.7=must accept daily transportation time of less than 2 hours per day 
0.5= must accept transport time of 2-3 hours 
0.3= must accept transport of 3-4 hours or more 
0.1=must be willing to move 
What acceptable reasons can be given for refusing a job 
offer or a training program while collecting benefits? 
0.75=relatively large number of valid reasons for refusal  
0.5=average amount of restrictions 
0.25= relatively few valid reasons for refusal 
If a person leaves a job voluntarily, what sanctions are  
applied? 
0.9=0-4 weeks without unemployment benefit 
0.7=5-9 weeks without unemployment benefit  
0.5= 10-14 weeks without unemployment benefit 
0.3= more than 14 weeks without unemployment benefit  
0.1=total suspension of unemployment benefit 
If a person refuses a job offer or refuses to participate in  
a training program while collecting benefits, what 
 sanctions are applied? 
0.9=0-4 weeks without unemployment benefit 
0.7=5-9 weeks without unemployment benefit  
0.5= 10-14 weeks without unemployment benefit 
0.3= more than 14 weeks without unemployment benefit  IE Working Paper                                    EC8-108-I                                   11 - 04 - 2005 
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0.1=total suspension of unemployment benefit 
If a person repeatedly refuses job offers or training  
programs while collecting benefits, what sanctions are applied? 
0.9=no further sanctions in cases of repeated rejections 
0.7= sanctions are more vigorous after third rejection 
0.5= sanctions are more vigorous after second rejection and unemployed 
could lose entitlement to benefits 
0.3= suspension of unemployment benefits after second rejection 
0.1=benefit has already been suspended after first rejection 
      What is the maximum period during which unemployment  
      benefits can be collected (as a fraction of one year)? 
  How long must a person work in order to be able to collect 
  unemployment benefits (number of weeks)? 
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Appendix 2:  Unemployment Benefit Indicator (“Net Reservation Wage”) for 21 OECD 
Countries, 1950-2003 
  AUS  AUT  BEL  CAN  DEN  FIN  FRA  GER  GRE  IRE  IT  JAP NTL  NZ  NOR  POR  SP  SWE  SWI  UK  US 
1960  1.5  6.9  20.7  6.4  0.0  0.2  7.6  4.4  1.5  4.0  1.1  0.9  1.4  11.6  0.3  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.0  1.7  0.7
1960  1.5  6.9  20.7  6.4  0.0  0.2  7.6  4.4  1.5  4.0  0.8  0.9  1.4  11.6  0.3  0.0  1.0  1.3  0.0  1.7  0.7
1962  1.7  6.6  18.9  6.4  0.0  0.2  7.6  4.5  1.5  4.1  0.7  0.9  1.4  11.0  0.3  0.0  1.0  1.2  0.0  1.7  0.8
1963  1.8  6.3  18.3  6.4  0.0  1.9  7.7  4.5  1.5  4.1  0.6  0.9  1.4  10.4  0.2  0.0  2.0  1.1  0.0  1.8  1.0
1964  1.7  5.9  17.1  6.2  0.0  1.8  7.7  4.5  1.5  4.1  0.6  0.9  3.3  14.6  0.2  0.0  3.0  1.4  0.0  1.8  0.9
1965  1.6  5.6  15.8  6.1  0.0  1.6  7.7  4.5  1.5  4.2  0.5  0.9  5.2  13.6  0.2  0.0  4.1  1.6  0.0  3.7  0.9
1966  1.5  5.1  13.1  5.9  0.0  1.5  7.6  4.4  1.5  4.2  0.5  0.9  5.1  13.5  0.2  0.0  4.1  1.6  0.0  3.8  0.9
1967  1.4  4.6  12.5  5.8  6.7  1.4  7.5  4.4  1.5  3.6  0.6  0.9  8.1  13.5  0.2  0.0  4.1  1.6  0.0  4.0  0.9
1968  1.3  6.1  14.8  6.2  7.5  1.8  8.0  4.4  1.5  3.5  0.5  0.9  8.2  13.4  0.2  0.0  4.1  1.9  0.0  4.0  0.9
1969  1.2  7.5  17.0  6.6  8.3  2.2  8.4  22.8  1.5  3.3  0.5  0.9  8.4  13.3  0.2  0.0  4.1  2.1  0.0  3.9  0.9
1970  1.2  7.8  17.1  6.4  8.1  2.6  7.9  22.5  1.5  3.4  0.4  0.9  8.4  12.1  0.3  0.0  3.4  2.1  0.0  3.8  1.0
1971  1.4  9.1  18.4  10.4  9.6  1.6  7.6  23.9  1.5  4.2  0.4  1.1  8.1  12.1  0.3  0.0  2.7  2.3  0.0  4.2  1.1
1972  1.5  8.7  19.6  12.4  9.7  3.8  7.4  23.6  1.5  4.0  0.4  1.1  8.1  12.3  0.4  0.0  2.7  2.5  0.0  4.1  1.1
1973  1.6  14.8  20.7  14.5  9.9  5.9  7.1  23.2  1.5  5.0  0.3  1.1  8.1  12.6  0.7  0.0  2.7  4.5  0.0  19.6 1.1
1974  1.9  14.9  21.0  14.2  10.4  5.5  7.7  23.6  1.5  5.9  0.4  7.5  8.5  12.7  0.7  0.0  3.7  5.8  0.0  18.4 1.7
1975  2.0  15.0  21.4  13.9  10.8  5.1  8.3  23.9  1.5  6.7  0.5  7.5  12.9  12.8  0.7  0.5  4.6  8.7  0.0  17.3 1.7
1976  2.2  16.5  21.3  13.7  11.5  5.6  8.0  24.0  1.5  7.6  0.4  6.2  12.9  12.5  1.2  0.5  6.4  9.0  0.0  18.8 2.0
1977  2.3  10.5  21.1  13.5  12.6  6.2  7.7  24.1  1.5  8.5  0.3  4.8  12.9  12.2  3.6  0.5  5.4  9.4  0.8  20.3 2.2
1978  13.1  11.3  21.0  13.0  13.4  5.9  7.7  24.4  1.5  8.7  0.3  4.8  12.9  12.2  3.6  0.6  5.4  16.7  1.1  19.7 2.6
1979  13.2  12.1  20.9  12.6  16.4  5.6  6.5  24.7  1.5  8.9  0.2  4.9  12.8  12.2  3.5  0.8  5.4  17.2  1.4  19.1 2.3
1980  12.5  12.1  20.5  12.5  17.2  5.3  7.5  24.5  1.5  8.9  0.2  4.9  12.9  12.7  4.3  0.8  7.0  17.2  1.4  19.2 2.5
1981  12.3  12.8  30.8  11.6  17.7  5.1  15.2  25.8  1.6  9.8  0.3  5.1  11.5  13.5  3.9  0.9  9.4  17.2  1.3  19.2 2.4
1982  12.3  11.8  30.5  12.5  18.1  5.3  15.0  25.6  1.6  10.5  0.3  5.0  11.5  14.0  3.9  0.8  9.4  18.2  2.0  18.2 2.3
1983  12.4  10.8  30.1  13.5  18.4  5.4  14.8  25.4  1.6  11.2  0.2  5.0  11.4  14.6  3.9  0.7  9.4  19.2  1.2  17.3 2.3
1984  12.7  11.8  30.0  13.5  17.9  19.2  15.7  25.0  1.6  10.5  0.2  5.5  12.2  14.6  4.6  1.5  11.3  19.2  6.5  16.9 2.3
1985  13.1  12.8  29.8  13.5  34.1  18.4  16.7  24.7  1.6  19.7  0.2  5.9  13.0  14.6  5.3  2.2  16.3  16.0  8.3  16.5 2.4
1986  13.4  12.6  29.6  13.5  32.9  18.8  17.4  24.4  1.9  20.2  0.2  5.9  12.9  14.9  5.3  2.7  16.2  16.4  8.3  14.5 2.1
1987  14.7  12.4  29.4  13.5  31.7  17.4  18.2  24.1  2.2  20.7  0.1  5.9  35.1  15.1  5.3  3.1  16.1  16.8  8.3  13.7 1.8
1988  14.7  12.0  27.3  13.6  32.4  16.9  18.0  24.2  0.0  19.7  0.6  5.8  33.6  15.0  5.3  3.2  16.1  16.7  8.3  13.4 1.9
1989  13.7  12.1  27.2  13.5  34.8  16.4  17.9  24.2  2.2  18.7  1.2  5.7  33.5  14.9  5.3  8.7  16.1  16.5  8.3  13.0 1.9
1990  13.1  12.5  27.0  13.3  34.9  17.6  18.0  24.8  7.6  19.6  1.1  5.7  32.9  14.5  5.3  9.0  16.0  16.6  9.9  11.7 1.8
1991  12.6  11.5  10.9  13.0  34.7  18.8  19.6  26.1  9.8  21.4  0.8  5.8  31.0  13.6  5.2  10.1  16.2  16.5  9.3  11.2 1.6
1992  12.8  10.7  10.7  11.6  34.7  18.8  19.6  25.7  11.2  21.9  3.1  5.8  29.4  13.5  5.2  10.3  15.7  16.3  10.9  10.6 1.6
1993  12.9  8.0  10.6  11.5  34.7  18.8  19.6  20.9  12.7  22.5  5.3  5.8  23.7  13.3  5.2  10.4  15.3  16.0  13.1  10.8 1.7
1994  11.2  7.9  10.3  11.4  37.4  19.8  19.5  20.5  12.7  20.8  5.7  5.9  23.6  12.7  5.2  10.4  16.7  15.7  13.1  10.6 1.1
1995  11.2  7.8  10.1  11.3  42.1  20.9  19.5  20.0  12.7  19.2  6.1  6.0  23.5  12.1  5.2  10.4  16.7  15.3  13.1  10.3 1.1
1996  10.8  8.5  10.3  16.0  41.9  19.9  19.1  20.9  11.8  20.6  5.9  6.1  15.0  13.2  5.2  11.0  16.7  15.4  12.9  4.7  1.2
1997  10.3  9.3  10.4  16.8  41.2  18.9  18.7  22.2  10.9  22.5  5.7  6.2  15.8  14.2  16.3  11.5  16.7  15.5  11.5  4.8  1.3
1998  10.3  10.0  10.3  16.8  40.4  19.1  19.0  22.7  10.8  22.1  6.0  6.7  15.8  12.5  16.6  12.3  16.5  15.0  13.2  4.5  1.3
1999  10.3  10.3  10.2  16.8  40.1  19.2  19.2  23.2  10.7  21.8  6.4  7.2  15.8  12.0  16.9  13.1  16.2  14.4  14.8  3.8  1.3
2000  10.3  10.3  10.2  16.8  40.1  19.2  19.2  23.2  10.7  17.5  6.4  7.2  15.8  12.0  16.9  13.1  13.8  14.4  14.8  3.8  1.3
2001  10.3  10.3  10.2  16.8  40.1  19.2  19.2  23.2  10.7  17.5  6.4  7.2  15.8  11.5  16.9  13.1  13.8  14.4  14.8  3.8  1.3
2002  10.3  10.3  10.2  16.8  40.1  19.2  19.2  23.2  10.7  17.5  6.4  7.2  15.8  9.2  16.9  13.1  14.6  14.4  14.8  3.8  1.3
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i The less educated are more likely to be unemployed:  in terms of levels, the ratio of employment to population 
in selected OECD countries is higher for more educated workers; less educated were invariably more likely to be 
unemployed than the more educated; and the differences in unemployment associated with education tended to 
rise.  Benefits redistribute incom e from the rich, higher-skilled or educat ed, to the poor, less educated.   The 
unemployed are also less likely to find jobs as time goes on. See Richard B. Freem an, ed., Working Under 
Different Rules, 1994, p. 41. 
iiIn fact, the factor that was shown to have the most important impact on exit rates from unemployment in the 
Spanish and Portuguese case was whet her an individual received unem ployment benefits or not (see Olym pia 
Bover,  Pilar  García-Perea,  Pedro Port ugal,  “A C omparative  Study  of  the  Portuguese  and Spani sh  Labour 
Markets”, Estudos e Documentos de Trabalho, Banco de Portugal, March 1998, pp. 17-18).  
iii  Sveinbjorn  Blondal  and M ark  Pearson , “Unem ployment  and  Other  Non-Employment  Benefits”,  Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 137-140. 
iv Abbring, van den Berg and van Ours (2000). 
v Hunt (1995) finds very large effects of the level of potential duration of benefits in Germany. 
vi  The em pirical  hazard function (or exit rate from   unemployment),  which shows how the changes of  re-
employment change as the length of the unemployment spell progresses, can be shown to decline over time; in 
other words, they are non-constant and are said to exhibit duration dependence.  There are reasons for this:  first, 
skill depreciation during unemployment makes the individual less employable; second, stigmatization of long-
term unemployed by potential employers leads to decreasing arrival rates of job offers;  third, discouragement 
lowers search intensity; and fourth, unobserved individual heterogeneity causes “spurious” negative duration 
dependence because in the presence of heterogenous individuals, the sample of those still unemployed is 
vii  Sveinbjorn  Blondal  and M ark  Pearson, “Unem ployment  and  Other  Non-Employment  Benefits”,  Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 137-140. Outflow rates have been found to increase considerably 
at around the times the unemployment benefits are exhausted in the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Spain 
and  Sweden,  raising  the  possibility  that  maximum  benefit  periods  influence  the  duration  of  unemployment 
spells.  Also unemployment benefit recipients have been shown to move to employment at a significantly lower 
pace than non-recipients; in fact, the factor that was shown to have the most important impact on exit rates from 
unemployment in the Spanish and  Portuguese case was whether an individual received unemployment benefits 
or not (see Olympia Bover, Pilar García-Perea, Pedro Portugal, “A Comparative Study of the Portuguese and 
Spanish Labour Markets”, Estudos e Documentos de Trabalho, Banco de Portugal, March 1998, pp. 17-18). 
viii The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Ireland have all introduced measures to 
offset the distortionary effects of high marginal effective tax rates on low incomes, as benefits are phased out and 
income becomes subject to tax after a low income threshold has been passed.  See Implementing the OECD Jobs 
Strategy:  Member Countries´ Experience, OECD, 1997, p. 63. There are al so numerous cases where  payroll 
taxes have been rai sed to finance rising unemployment insurance costs.  See, for instance,  OECD Economic 
Surveys:  Canada, 1996.  There is evidence that the rate of increase in the tax rather than its overall level is the 
better indicator of potential harm to the labor market. 
ix A. Lindbeck, “The Welfare State and the Employment Problem”, American Economic Review 84 (2: 1994), p. 
74.   
x There are num erous cases where payroll taxes have b een raised to finance ri sing unemployment insurance 
costs.  See, for instance, OECD Economic Surveys:  Canada, 1996.  There is evidence that the rate of increase in 
the tax rather than its overall level is the better indicator of potential harm to the labor market. 
xi  Layard  (1988) sum marizes:   “The correl ation  of une mployment  duration  with  unemployment  benefits  is 
predicted by almost every known model of unemployment.”  It should be noted that the strength of all of these 
disincentive effects depends on the  eligibility criteria for benefits, wh ich make payment conditional upon job 
search and related behavior.  These criteria can offset or  even reverse the disincentiv e effects that arise when 
benefits  are paid without these conditions; and  at  the  aggregate level, the  European  countries where 
unemployment  fell m ost  sharply in the 1990s had tighten ed  the im plementation  of  their  benefit eligibility 
criteria. See OECD Employment Outlook 2000, p. 129 and rest of article.  Note that the enforcement of eligibility 
criteria may have a larger im pact on behavior than vari ations in replacement rates and effective m arginal tax 
rates, because the incom e implications for the beneficiary are larger :  ineligibility means the replacement rate 
falls to zero.    
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xii There are num erous cases where payroll taxes have b een raised to finance ri sing unemployment insurance 
costs.  See, for instance, OECD Economic Surveys:  Canada, 1996.  There is evidence that the rate of increase in 
the tax rather than its overall level is the better indicator of potential harm to the labor market. 
xiii Sveinbjorn Blondal and Mark Pearson , “Unem ployment and Other Non-Employment Benefits”, Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 137. 
xiv The OECD has calculated average gross  replacement rates for odd-num bered years from 1961 on.  Som e 
countries make available other benefits to the unemployed, which would raise the reservation wage further, and 
these are not included in the OECD figures. The Centraal Planbureau in The Hague has developed an index that 
uses net replacement rates plus housing and other benefits available for the unemployed in the European Union 
and three U.S. states, and this index  gives a very different  picture of the replacement rate; but this index was 
developed only for a single year, 1993, and would be too difficult to replicate in this study.  However, it might 
be used for a “snapshot” comparison. 
xv OECD, Benefits and Wages:  OECD Indicators, Paris 2002, p. 10. 
xvi OECD, Benefits and Wages:  OECD Indicators, Paris 2002, p. 33 gi ves examples for a single year (1999). 
Data for net replacement rates can be obtained on line for 1997 and 1999. 
xvii OECD, Benefits and Wages:  OECD Indicators, Paris 2002, p. 12. 
xviii Olympia Bover, Pilar García-Perea, Pedro Portugal, “A Comparative Study of the Portuguese and Spanish 
Labour Markets”, Estudos e Documentos de Trabalho, Banco de Portugal, March 1998, pp. 16-18).  See al so 
Sveinbjorn Blondal and Mark Pearson , “Unemployment and Other Non-Employment Benefits”, Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 137-140. Outflow rates were found to increase considerably at around the 
times  the  unemployment  benefits  were ex hausted  in  the  United  States,  Canada,  Japan, France, Spai n  and 
Sweden, raising the possibility that maximum benefit periods influence the duration of unemployment spells.  
The  empirical  hazard function (or exit rate from   unemployment),  which shows how the changes  of  re-
employment change as the length of the unemployment spell progresses, can be shown to decline over time; in 
other words, they are non-constant and are said to exhibit duration dependence.  There are reasons for this:  first, 
skill depreciation during unemployment makes the individual less employable; second, stigmatization of long-
term unemployed by potential employers leads to decreasing arrival rates of job offers;  third, discouragement 
lowers search intensity; and fourth, unobserved individual heterogeneity causes “spurious” negative duration 
dependence  because  in the presence of heterogenous i ndividuals,  the sam ple  of those still unem ployed  is 
increasingly made up of those workers with unobserved characteristics which make them less employable.   
xix In all of these respects, Norway is a model of all-round strictness:  the unemployed must generally accept shift 
and night work, be prepared to work anywhere in Norway (and a spouse who quits a job to avoid separation of 
the couple and then claims benefit will be penalized for a voluntary quit), must be ready to accept any job they 
can do without reference to their previous occupation or wage level, and cannot refuse a job on rel igious or 
ethical grounds.  The Uni ted States, Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom require 
individuals to report their job search i n some detail and specify a minimum frequency of job appl ications or 
actions of job search.  In t he United States, the unemployed in most states have to make two or more job 
applications every week.  In France there is a principle of permanent job search and the unemployed are required 
to keep documentation and intensive reviews of job search are conducted at intervals of four months or more and 
are a prime instrument in verification of eligibility. 
xx Imagine that the unem ployed receive a series of job o ffers at different wage leve ls, and would  reject those 
paying wages below their “reservation wage”.  Pay ment of the benefit raises the reservation wage and coul d 
hence increase the expected duration  of unemployment spells.  But if the public employment service imposes 
strong sanctions, such as permanent exclusion from the benefit system, if an offer paying a “suitable” wage is 
rejected, that “suitable wage” can be set below the reservation wage that unemployed people would choose in the 
absence of any benefit system.  Unemployment spell durations should therefore be lower than under laissez faire.  
See Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1995. 
xxi P. Auer,  Employment Revival in Europe:  Labour Market Success in Austria, Denmark, Ireland and the 
Netherlands, ILO, Geneva, 2000. 
xxii Ministry of Finance, Denm ark, “Availability Criteria in Selected OECD Countries”,  Working Paper no. 6, 
November 1998. 
xxiii Table 8.B.1., p. 226,  The OECD Jobs Study:  Evidence and Explanations.  The y ears included are 1961, 
1971, 1981 and 1991.  
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xxiv This issue is a complex one, since tax is also applied to the average production wage, which the OECD uses 
as the denominator in its replacement rate, and different personal income tax rates apply to many of the different 
situations  which the OECD estim ates  in calculating  its  replacement  rate. The OECD  ratio,  given  for  four 
different years, reflects the effect on both personal income tax and social security payments on wages and 
benefits. I have attempted to pinpoint when possible the year when changes in tax treatment took place, through 
my review of labor legislation and the literature. 
xxv  Since in m ost  EU countries unem ployment  benefits  can  be received for an inde finite  period, this does 
overlook an important aspect of the generosity of the unemployment insurance system:  Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1991) show that economies respond well to exogenous shocks if they have an unemployment benefit 
system that discourages long-term unemployment, by which they mean a system that offers unemployment 
benefits for a relatively short duration of 15 months or less; and  Katz and Meyer (1990) concluded that in the 
United States, the length of the benefit period had a larger impact on the exit rate from unemployment than the 
benefit level.  In this indicator, the value of 1 represents a duration of one year or more.  However, the move 
from a fraction of a year to a year or more does represent an important change in the generosity of benefits. 
xxvi  Initially the idea was to use a coverage rate as  a  proxy  for the strictness of   eligibility conditions for 
unemployment insurance.  However, since this indicator did not appear to correlate well with the scores of the 
Danish  study,  and si nce  developing  the  year-by-year,  country-by-country  EPL i ndicator  described  above 
involved a thorough review of labor-market legislation, I decided to attempt to develop an equally precise 
indicator for unemployment benefit eligibility. 
xxvii Under Social Security Act of 1935, which created the system. 
xxviii The Social Security Act (1935) also provides the basis for an unusual Federal state unemployment insurance 
system, under which the federal government establishes minimum guidelines and oversees t he operation and 
performance of the system, while the states are free to enact their own laws as long as they comply with federal 
standards.   See Flanagan,  Robert  J.,  “The  United  States:  Decentralized Heterogeneity”,  Labour Market 
Contracts and Institutions, J. Hartog and J. Theeuwes, eds., Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., 1993, p. 39. 
xxix According to Layard, et. al. (1991) under the income support scheme, all of an individual´s rent (or his/her 
mortgage interest if a house owner) is also payable (unless the individual has savings of over 3,000 pounds; also 
account is taken of pension and/or redundancy payments).  This obviously increases the replacement ratio.  See 
also Joris Ghysels and Anne Thirion, Final Report to the European Commission under project number V/031/98 
To  Identify and Com pare  Social  Protection  System  Benefits and Repl acement  Rates and Their Effect on 
Employment Participation in the Light of the 1998 Employment guidelines, 23 April 1999. 
xxx The first case is for a one-earner couple with two children and the second for a single person.  It should be 
noted that the OECD averages out 18 different situations in its replacement rate, as discussed above. 
xxxi Centraal Planbureau, “Replacement rates: A translatlantic view”, Working paper no. 80 (Septem ber 1995), 
The Hague. 
xxxii  My d ecision  followed  the  OECD´s  lead:   th e  OECD  also  includes  only  the  income  available from  
unemployment insurance schemes in its replacement rates, partly because the other income support systems are 
so varied and com plex, but also because m any of them are means-tested and therefore cannot be considered 
“insurance”. 
xxxiii The CIG, an extraordinary insurance benefit that applies in industrial sectors, offers a special unemployment 
allowance  equal  to  two-thirds  of t he  last  daily  earnings  paid  for 180 day s,  when unemployment  is  due to 
redundancy because of cessation of the ente rprise or of reduction in staff.  It  gives cost flexibility to employers 
but also freezes a sizeable fraction of the industrial labor  force in inactive situati ons; beneficiaries reportedly 
work in huge numbers on the black market. CIG benefits and the Mobility allowance are paid only when the firm 
applies for these benefits in connection with a collective layoff. The CIG was much expanded in the 1970s. The 
CIGS was introduced in 1968, payable in cases of i ndustry-wide or local economy crises or restructuring of 
production. This made it possible to pay CIG during long-term layoffs. Legislation in 1977 clarified the principle 
that CIGS could, in socially relevant cases, be paid even when there was no expectation that the firm ’s business 
might recover. Special arrangements were introduced for the INPS to pay benefits directly to workers instead of 
employers, in cases where the com pany formally employing them had effectively ceased to exist.  In the  1980s 
there  were m any  cases of  workers  receiving  CIG  for  five years or m ore.  Law  223/1991 replaced Special 
Unemployment Benefits with a new Mobility allowance, initially paid at the same rate as CIG and reduced by 
20% after one year. Firm s must pay into INPS the  equivalent of 6 months of benefit for each worker put into 
Mobility. (Source: various OECD reports) 